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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper uses tax return data for the period 1951-1990 toinvestigate
the rising share of adjusted gross income (AGI) that isreported on very
high income tax returns. We find that most of this increase isdue to a
rise in reported income for the one quarter of one percentof taxpayers
with the highest AGIs. The share of total AGI reportedby these taxpay-
ers rose slowly in the early 1980s,and increased sharply in 1987 and
1988. This pattern suggests that at least part of the increasein the income
share of high-AGI taxpayers was due to the changing taxincentives that
were enacted in the 1986 Tax ReformAct. By lowering marginal tax rates
on top-income households from 50% to28%, TRA86 reduced the incen-
tive for these households to engage in tax avoidanceactivities. We also
find substantial differences in the growth of the incomeshare of the
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highest one quarter of one percent of taxpayers, and the share of other
very high income taxpayers. This casts doubt on the view that the in-
creasing inequality of reported incomes at very high levels is driven by
the same factors that have generated widening wage inequality at lower
income levels.
The evolution of U.S. income distribution has recently attracted enor-
mous academic and popular attention. Systematic studies of labor earn-
ings based on large household surveys, such as those by Bound and
Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Michel (1991), and
Murphy and Welch (1992), have demonstrated that labor earnings, the
most important component of income for all but the highest income
households, became more unequal during the 1980s. The returns to
college education rose, and the real earnings of low-skill individuals
declined relative to those of better-trained workers.
The most controversial feature of the income distribution, however, is
the apparent increase in the share of income accruing to a small group of
very high-income households: those in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution. A widely publicized calculation, described in Krugman
(1992), suggests that very high-income households received a dispropor-
tionate share of the real income growth in the U.S. economy during the
last decade.
Measuring the income and wealth of high-income households is ex-
tremely difficult. The economic lives of the rich, especially the rich who
are not famous, are something of a mystery. Mandel (1992) estimates
that there are only a few thousand highly visible, highly compensated
individuals in the U.S. economyathletes, top executives at large com-
panies, and partners at major law firms and investment banks. Various
sources suggest that the compensation received by these individuals
rose rapidly during the last decade. Yet whether the experiences of this
group generalize to the nearly one million households in the top 1 per-
cent of the income distribution remains an open question. Information
from income tax returns remains the most reliable, if imperfect, source of
information about the economic activities of this group.
One class of explanations for the apparent increase in the relative
incomes of high- versus low-income households focuses on changes in
economic institutions or structure that might raise wages or capital in-
comes for the high-income group. Slemrod (1993) argues that increasing
globalization of economic activity may raise the incomes of high-ability
individuals by more than that of the less able. The rise of new financial
institutions and practices during the last fifteen yearsfor example,
takeovers and leveraged buyoutsmay also have expanded the opportu-Income Inequality/Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers147
nities for a small group of individuals to earn veryhigh incomes. This
explanation for rising incomes of top "performers"follows the analysis
of superstar compensation developed by Rosen(1981) and explored fur-
ther in Frank and Cook (1992).
An alternative explanation for the growth ofreported income inequal-
ity focuses on changes in taxpayer incentives toreport taxable income,
rather than defer income recognition or otherwiseshelter accruing in-
come. Because high-incomehouseholds derive more of their income
from portfolio investments and self-employment thanhouseholds else-
where in the income distribution, they are likely tohave more opportu-
nity to engage in legal tax avoidance, and morediscretion in deciding
how, and how much, of their income is reported tothe Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), than their lower-income counterparts.The tax reforms of
1981 and 1986 lowered marginal tax rates on high-incomehouseholds,
reducing their incentives to engage in various formsof tax avoidance.
Taxpayers at the top of the income distributionfaced marginal tax rates
as high as 70 percent in 1980,while in 1988, their marginal tax rates were
capped at 28 percent.
The suggestion that recent tax reforms inducedchanges in reported
taxable income, even if they did not affect taxpayerbehavior, lies at the
center of the recent debate on whetherthe tax reforms of the 1980s in-
creased labor supply (see Bosworth and Burtless,1992, and Lindsey,
1987a, 1988). Because the Congressional BudgetOffice (CBO) data on
income distribution, the data underlying theKrugman (1992) calculation,
rely on tax returns for data on the incomes ofhigh-income households,
changes in taxpayer reporting behavior could directlyaffect estimates of
income inequality at top income levels.
This paper presents new evidence on the changingshare of adjusted
gross income (AGI) reported by veryhigh-income taxpayers. We focus
primarily on the comparison of annual incomedistributions for the
years 1951-1990 and limit mostof our analysis to the top one-half of 1
percent of taxpayers. We document thechanging composition of in-
come reported by thesehouseholds, and we try to provide some evi-
dence on the importance of tax-induced changes inincome reporting in
contributing to this group's rising share of AGI. Wedo not explore the
variation in the relative incomes of householdselsewhere in the income
distribution, a subject that has also attractedsubstantial controversy
(see Nasar, 1992, and Roberts, 1992). Forstudying the distribution of
incomes below the top tier, tax returns are notthe best source of
information. Not all low-income households file tax returns,and even
for those who do, tax returns do not includeinformation on most
transfer payments.148Feenberg and Poterba
This paper is divided into six sections. The first describesour methods
for using tax return data to estimate the share andcomposition of in-
come accruing to high-income taxpayers, whom we label Top AGI Recipi-
ents (TARs). Section II describes the impact of the major tax reformsin
1981 and 1986 on the incentives for high-incometaxpayers to report
taxable income. The third section presents time series informationon the
share of AGI, as well as various AGI components suchas wages and
salaries, dividends, interest, and capital gains, reported by thesetaxpay-
ers. We find that most of the increase in the share of income reported by
taxpayers in the top fifth of the income distribution is accounted for by
an increase in the share of reported income in the top one quarter of 1
percent of taxpayers.
Our results also suggest that the increase in reported incomeinequal-
ity is not simply an artifact of capital gains realizations in the1980s, but
reflects changes in the distribution of most other incomesources as well.
The share of income reported by top income taxpayersrose throughout
the 1980s, but we find the sharpest increase in 1987 and 1988,the years
following a significant decline in marginal tax rates. We thereforecon-
clude that changes in decisions about how much taxable incometo re-
port have contributed to the observed increase in the reported incomes
of high-income households. Unfortunately,we cannot estimate the
share of the reported income increase that is due solelyto changes in
taxpayer reporting practices.
Section IV presents data on the composition of reportedincome for
high-income households. Wages and salaries became substantiallymore
important, and capital income less important, between 1970and the
mid-1980s. We find that this trend began roughly in 1969, when thetop
marginal tax rate on earned income fell from 77 percentto 50 percent.
The fifth section investigates the extent to which the changingincome
share of top-income taxpayers can be attributed to changes in thecompo-
sition of factor rewards in the aggregate economy, rather thanto shifts
within the distribution of each type of factor income. We find thathigh
stock market returns during the 1980s would have raised theincome
share of top-income taxpayers even if the ownership of stockhad re-
mained fixed at its 1979 levels. The actual share of incomereceived by
these households rose faster than the changing distribution ofaggregate
factor rewards would have predicted. The changing mix of factorin-
comes is particularly unsuccessful in explaining the rapid growth in the
share of AGI reported by high-income households in theyears following
the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The final section concludes andsuggests sev-
eral avenues for further work.Income Inequality/Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers149
I. ESTIMATING THEINCOME OF VERY
HIGH-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
The CBO publishes widely cited estimatesof the U.S. income distribu-
tion (1992a, 1992b). This distribution isdefined in terms of adjusted
family income (AFI). AFI is similar to AGI asdefined by the federal
income tax, but it also includes cashtransfer payments and imputed
corporate taxes, and excludes some businesslosses that can be deducted
when taxpayers compute AGI.
Table 1 shows the CBO's estimates of theshare of AFI accruing to
households in the top fifth of the income distributionduring the period
1977-1988. The estimates show a rising share ofincome accruing to this
group, and in particularshow that the top 1 percent of households
account for a very large share of thetotal increase for the top quintile. In
1977, the estimates suggest that the top20 percent of all households
received 45.6 percent of adjusted family income,while in 1988 the analo-
gous group received51.4 percent of the total. The share received by the
top one percent of households, however, rosefrom 8.3 percent (1977) to
13.4 percent (1988). This 5.2 percent increaseis 90 percent of the 5.8
percent increase for the top 20 percent.The lower panel in Table 1 shows
the share of wages and salaries accruing tothe top 20 percent and the
top 1 percent of households. Thehighest 1 percent accounts for two-
TABLE 1.
CBO Income Distribution Estimates,1977-1988.
Source: Congressional Budget Office (1992b). The statistics inthe top panel are also reported in the U.S.
House of Representatives 1992 Green Book (p. 1521).
Percent
1977 1980 1985 1988
Share of adjusted family income received by
Top 20% 45.6 46.7 50.1 51.4
81-90% 15.6 15.7 15.7 15.3
91-95% 10.1 10.1 10.4 10.1
95-99% 11.6 11.7 12.4 12.6
Top 1% 8.3 9.2 11.6 13.4
Share of wages and salaries received by
Top 20% 42.1 43.5 45.8 47.7
81-90% 17.7 17.8 17.9 17.5
91-95% 10.5 10.7 11.2 11.1
95-99% 9.8 10.3 11.2 11.4
Top 1% 4.1 4.7 5.5 7.7150Feenberg and Poterba
thirds of the gain in the share ofwages and salaries reported by the top
20 percent of households.
An income distribution can be definedover households, as in the CBO
estimates, individuals, or taxpayers.' Each of these threeoptions has
advantages and drawbacks. Focusing on householdscan be misleading
because demographic changescan shift the characteristics and number of
households. Between 1960 and 1989, theaverage number of individuals
per U.S. household declined from 3.3 to 2.6. The shares of single-person
households, and of households headed bya single adult with children,
have increased significantly in recent decades. Becausethese households
have lower incomes on average than other households,the share of in-
come accruing to a given fraction of households at the top of the income
distribution should increase as a result of this demographicchange.2 Fo-
cusing on individuals also raises difficult issues, suchas the treatment of
spouses and children. Do they receive a proportional share of house-
hold income? If so, then ifa single high-income taxpayer marries a
lower-income earner, she may drop out of the high-incomecategory.
The birth of children to high-income householdscould have the same
effect.
Defining the income distribution in terms ofa given share of tax re-
turns, the natural choice given our relianceon tax data, can also yield
spurious results. The number of tax returns filed varies withchanges in
the tax law. The 1986 Tax Reform Actwas expected to remove almost six
million low-income households from the tax rolls, althoughin practice it
had a far smaller effect (see Hausman and Poterba,1987 and Slemrod,
1992). By shrinking the number of taxpayers, sucha reform would lower
the number of tax returns in the top percentile of thetaxpayer distribu-
tion. Because the taxpayers removed from thetax rolls typically have
very low incomes, this change would reduce the share of incomere-
ported by the top percentile of taxpayers. This couldbias comparisons
between income distribution statistics,even for adjacent years, when the
tax system is in flux.
Our approach to identifying the top of the income distributionbegins
with tax returns filed in 1989. We select the one-half of 1percent of these
returns with the highest AGI; there were 558,778 taxreturns in this
1In 1989, of ninety-three million households in the United States,sixty-six million were
"family households." There were 113 million tax returns filed in 1989.
2While this may contaminate comparisons of the top of the householdincome distribution
in widely separated years, it is unlikely to have a large effecton comparisons of the income
distribution over short time periods.Income Inequality/Incomes of VeryHigh-Income Taxpayers151
group.3 We define this numberof returns as N1989 and then compute an
analogous number of returns inother years by multiplying N1989 bythe
ratio of the adult population ineach year to that in 1989. Our procedure,
which follows McCubbin andScheuren (1988), indexes the numberof
high-income tax returns to the aggregatepopulations rather than the
number of tax returns filed or thenumber of households. We define the
top N taxpayers ineach year as "Top AG! Recipients"(TARs). They
represent roughly half as manyhouseholds as the CBO's top 1 percent
of the income distribution.4
A. Estimating Income SharesUsing the Treasury Tax Model
In each year since 1968, the U.S.Treasury has released a data file contain-
ing an anonymous sampleof individual tax returns, the TreasuryTax
Model data base, which can be used toestimate the total income of high-
income taxpayers. This data fileover-samples high-income tax returns,
providing reasonably accurateinformation on this group's income.
Table 2 shows the number of tax returnsat different income levels in
the 1989 Tax Model and indicatesthe sampling weights associated with
returns in each group. There arenearly 12,000 returns with incomesof
more than $1,000,000in the data base. The probabilitythat a tax filer
with taxable income in this rangewould be included in the data file is
approximately one in five. There are asimilar number of tax returns with
taxable incomes between $50,000and $100,000, but each return filed in
this income group has less than a1 in 1,000 chance of being included on
the data file. The Treasury TaxModel data bases for each year since 1979
are part of theNBER TAXSIM program, and we usethese data files to
tabulate the distribution of bothAG! and various AGI componentsfor
these years.5
Our reported income share forhigh-income households would not change if a topin-
come taxpayer married someonewith no income, although it would increaseif a high-
income taxpayer married another incomerecipient. It is also possible that marriages or
divorces between individuals with high,but not very high, incomes could affect the in-
come reported by the TAR group.
"Although our data set on federal tax returnsdoes not include information on the state in
which the tax filer resides, we can comparethe number of federal income tax returnsabove
various threshold income levels with state revenuestatistics. They show some, but not
extreme, concentration of tax returns.In 1989, for example, New York residentsfiled 3.7
percent of all federal income tax returns,but 12.9 percent of all returns with AGI in excess
of $1 million.
We compute the changing shares of AGIreported in each year, despite the fact that the
definition of AGI changes when, forexample, the capital gains exclusion is eliminated.This
is partly for comparison with thewidely cited results from the CBO. Ourresults also focus
on several componentsof AGI with constant definitions through time.152Feenberg and Poterba
TABLE 2.
Tax Returns Included in the TreasuryTax Model Data Base.
Income class Number of returns Average sample weight
<50K 53,680 1,794 50-lOOK 11,947 1,087 100-200K 4,561 455 200-500K 6,705 91 500-1,000K 7,700 15 >1,000K 11,996 5
Source: Authors' tabulations from 1989 Tax Model DataFile.
B. "Interpolating" Incomes forHigh-Income Taxpayers
For years prior to 1979,we rely on aggregate data published by the
Treasury Department in Statistics of Income:Individual Income Tax Returns
(SOT) to estimate the income of TARs.6The SOT tables show the number
of tax returns, and reported ACT,in various taxable income intervals.
The reported ACT categories for high-incometaxpayers have remained
fixed in nominal terms for nearly threedecades, with taxpayers divided
into those with ACTs of 100-200K,200-500K, 500-1,000K, andmore
than one million dollars. Estimatingthe amount of ACT reported bya
given share of taxpayers thereforerequires interpolating the IRS data.
To estimate the total income accruingto the top 0.5 percent of taxpayers,
we interpolate ACT within categories below $1 million.We estimate a Par-
eto distribution for high-income tax returns anduse our estimated distri-
bution to estimate the total incomeaccruing to top ACT recipients (TARs).
The Pareto is a two-parameter distributionthat is widely used in modeling
the distributions of income andwages (see Johnson and Kotz, 1970).
We present the details ofour interpolation procedure in an appendix
but illustrate our method in Figure1. This figure shows our estimated
Pareto distribution for 1990,a year when our estimate of the income
threshold for the top 0.5 percent oftaxpayers () was $258,499. In this
case, we can determine from the reported IRS datathat the ACT thresh-
old for the top 0.5 percent oftaxpayers lies between $200,000 and
$500,000. We use the reported informationon the fraction of tax returns
with ACT above $200,000, andon the fraction with ACT above $500,000,
to estimate the parameters of a Pareto distribution.We then use this
estimated distribution to estimate Y'.
6 To ensure comparabilityover time, in any of our tables or figures that show resultsfor the 1951-1990 period, we also interpolate duringthe 1979-1990 period when we could
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FIGURE 1. Sample Pareto DensityFunction: alpha = 1.59, k = 6,619
(1990 parameters).
Table 3 describes the results of our interpolationprocedure. The first
and second columns present our estimatesof the cutoff income level
for the Top ACT Recipients. Figure2 plots this income threshold,
which increased only 10 percent in real termsbetween 1970 and 1985,
but in the four years, 1985-1989, itincreased by nearly 50 percent, or
almost $85,000 ($1991). The late 1980s,therefore, appears to be the
period of most rapid change in thereported income distribution at
high incomes.
The third and fourth columns in Table 3show the number and share
of tax returns that are included in ourhigh-income group. These col-
umns show the net effectof indexing the number of TARs to theadult
population, rather than to the number of taxreturns filed.7 In the years
since 1986, the share of returns inthe TAR group varies very little.
Between 1986 and 1987, it declined by.02 percent. There is very little
change in the share of tax returns in theTAR group between 1975 and
1986, although there is some evidencethat the number of tax returns
grew more slowly thanpopulation for the period 1955-1975. Our TAR
Indexing to the number of returns filed wouldmake the last column of Table 3 equal to
0.005 in all years.FIGURE 2. High-Income Threshold for TARs: 1951-1990.
TABLE 3.
Income Thresholds for "Top AGI Recipients," 1955-1990.
Source: Authors' calculations using data from annual publications of Statisticsof Income: Individual Tax
Returns. Data in column three are in thousands of returns. The definitionof the "high income thresh-
old" is the income level that excludes only the 0.005' (Adult Population1)/(AdultPopulation15) highest- income tax returns.
Year
High-income threshold Returns above threshold
Current dollars 1991 Dollars Number (000s) Percent of total
1955 28,466 144,801 334 0.0057
1960 31,290 144,098 355 0.0058
1965 39,836 172,197 384 0.0057
1970 49,594 173,978 410 0.0055
1975 61,721 156,204 441 0.0054
1980 104,611 172,895 502 0.0054
1981 111,670 167,274 510 0.0054
1982 117,797 166,258 517 0.0054
1983 125,448 171,546 523 0.0054
1984 137,723 180,566 529 0.0053
1985 150,996 191,189 535 0.0053
1986 171,195 212,727 541 0.0053
1987 199,436 239,059 548 0.0051
1988 238,652 274,762 554 0.0051
1989 251,338 276,066 558 0.0050
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group includes a larger shareof tax returns in 1960 (0.58 percent) than
in 1970 (0.55 percent), 1980 (0.54 percent), or1990 (0.50 percent). This
should tend to increase the share ofreported income accruing to the
TAR group in the early years of our dataperiod, and yield a down-
ward bias in our estimate of the trend inthe TAR income share over
time.
II. TAX CHANGES ANDINCENTIVES FOR
REPORTING TAXABLE INCOME
Tax policy parameters such as marginal taxrates can affect the amount
of income reported on tax returns eitherby inducing real changes in
individual behavior, such as changes in thenumber of hours that indi-
viduals work, or by inducing changes inthe reporting of a given in-
come stream. Because taxpayers canuse a variety of tax avoidance
techniques to defer or reclassify their income,the tax base is sensitive
to decisions about how muchincome to report. This section provides a
brief overview of the changing taxavoidance incentives facing high-
income taxpayers.
A. Earned Income
The two most significant changes in the taxrates on earned income of
high-income taxpayers took place in 1969 and1986. The Tax Reform Act
of 1969 capped the marginal tax rate onearned income at 50 percent, at a
time when the top marginal tax rate onunearned income was 70 percent
(77 percent including the Vietnam warsurtax). The top marginal tax rate
on earned incomeremained at 50 percent through 1986, although rates
just below those of top income taxpayers werereduced by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA). The TaxReform Act of 1986 (TRA86)
reduced the top marginal tax rate on earned aswell as unearned income
from 50 percent to 28 percent, further loweringthe incentives to (legally)
avoid taxes.
Declining marginal tax rates reduced theincentives to engage in a vari-
ety of tax avoidance practices. Onesimple avoidance strategy involves
transforming earned income into fringebenefits, ranging from company
cars and conference"vacations," to health and life insurance policies.
There is a large literature, summarized inWoodbury and Hammermesh
(1992), suggesting that the demand forfringe benefits is sensitive to the
marginal tax rate on earned income. Arelated strategy involves deferring
earned income, and the associated taxes, tolater years. Over long hori-156Feenberg and Poterba
zons, income could be deferred with retirement plansor deferred compen-
sation arrangements8
Some taxpayers may also have used income-retimingstrategies over
shorter tax-planning horizons, movingwages and salaries income from
1986 to 1987 or 1988, and capital gain realizationsfrom later years to
1986. Taxpayers with some controlover the timing of when clients are
billed for their services, and those whoreceive large bonuses or other-
wise lumpy earned income, faced strongincentives in 1986 to find
ways to avoid recognizing income until lower tax rates became effective
in later years. Deferring income by fourteenmonths, from December
1986 to January 1988, could raise a taxpayer's after-taxincome by 44
percent (from $0.50 on the dollar to $0.72). This providedpowerful
incentives to engage in a widerange of income-retiming activities,
which are unfortunately difficult tomeasure from tax returns or other
public data sources.9
A particularly significant dimension of TRA86was its change in the
incentives for using Subchapter C corporationsto avoid recognizing
personal income. Before 1986,a dollar reported as individual income
faced a tax burden of $0.50, whilea dollar earned by a Subchapter C
corporation faced a marginal tax rate of 46percent, with somewhat
lower rates on the first $100,000 of income.Corporate income could bear
subsequent individual-level taxes if itwas distributed as wages or divi-
dends, although there were strategies, forexample, bequeathing stock
in a closely held business, that could reduce suchtaxes.
After TRA86 was fully phased in, the toppersonal income tax rate was
below the corporate tax rate. A dollar of incomereported directly on an
individual income tax return faceda tax burden of 28 percent starting in
1988, compared with at least 34 percent if itwas earned by a Subchapter
C company. As Gordon and Mackie-Mason(1990) explain, these tax
changes reduced the incentive touse corporations to shelter income, and
they could have led to an increase inreported income for high-income
taxpayers. Anecdotal evidence of the potential importanceof this effect
is provided by Scholes and Wolfson (1992),who note that there were
225,000 S-corporation elections in the last three weeksof 1986, compared
with only 75,000 elections in the entirety of 1985.
8In the first few years of a low-tax rate regime, suchas 1987 and 1988, it is even possible
that individuals who had previously deferred income bycontributing to retirement plans
would withdraw plan assets, also leading to an increase inreported income.
Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992) document the importanceof retiming of corporate
income around this tax change, which reduced thestatutory corporate tax rate from 46
percent to 34 percent.Income Inequality/Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers157
B. Capital Income
The tax changes that were enacted in 1981 reducedthe top tax rate on
unearned income other than capital gains from 70 percent to50 percent.
TRA86 further reduced this top rate to 28 percent. The taxrules affecting
capital gains are more complex. Between 1969 and 1978,60 percent of
long-term capital gains could be excluded from taxableincome, implying
a top marginal tax rate of28 percent (70%*.4). For some taxpayers, how-
ever, because the excluded portionof capital gains was considered a tax
preference item for the minimum tax, the marginal rate onrealized gains
could exceed 40 percent (see Lindsey, 198Th). This situation waschanged
by the Tax Reform Act of 1978 (TRA78), whichexcluded capital gains from
the set of minimum tax preference items, effectiveJanuary 1, 1979. In
addition, the 1978 reform lowered the share of long-termgains that was
included in taxable income from 50 percent to 40 percentfor gains realized
after October 31, 1978. These changes reduced the maximum statutorytax
rate on long-term capital gains to 28 percentbeginning with the 1979 tax
year. The preannounced reduction in topmarginal rates at the highest
incomes led to significant delay in the realizationof capital gains by TARs.
The 1981 tax reform, ERTA, further reduced themarginal tax rate on gains
for top income taxpayers, because the reduction inmarginal tax rates to 50
percent coupled with the 60 percent exclusiongenerated a top capital
gains tax rate of 20 percent.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 raised the topmarginal rate on capital
gains from 20 percent to 28 percent, because iteliminated the partial
exclusion of long-term gains from taxable income.Because the 1986
changes were legislated to take effect in 1987, there was astrong incen-
tive for taxpayers with accrued but unrealizedgains to realize these
gains in 1986. This "retiming" of gains is astriking feature of the time
series on gain realizations (see Auerbach, 1988).
This brief summary of the tax rates facing high-incomehouseholds
suggests that there have been importantchanges over time in the after-
tax income gains associated with taxavoidance strategies.1° We now
consider the detailed information on income reportsby these house-
holds, to investigate whether there is evidence thatsuch changes in
taxpayer behavior took place.
10 The discussion has focussed on legal tax avoidance strategies, although some taxpayers
may resort to illegal strategies such asincome underreporting. Poterba (1987) provides
evidence on the potential sensitivity of evasion forcapital gains, an important income
source for high-income households, with respectto marginal tax rates.158Feenberg and Poterba
III. THE SHARE OF INCOME RECEIVED BY TOP AGI
RECIPIENTS
This section reports our basic findings on the changingconcentration of
reported income among high-income taxpayers. Figure 3 showsour esti-
mate of the share of ACT accruing to TARs in eachyear between 1951
and 1990.11 The ACT share of this group declined during the 1950sand
1960s, was roughly stable during the 1970s, and increased during the
1980s. The share of ACT reported by roughly the top one-half of 1per-
cent of taxpayers rose from 6 percent in 1981 to over 12 percent in 1988.
The sharpest increase in ACT concentration occurred between 1985and
1988, when the income share of this grouprose from 8 percent to 12
percent. The TAR share of ACT also fell more than a fullpercentage
point in 1989 and 1990, which could be consistent withan active role for
short-term and one-time income retiming strategies in theyears immedi-
ately following enactment of TRA86.
One possible explanation for the rising concentration of ACIamong
top income recipients is that capital gains realizationsrose during the
1980s, and that they are a highly concentrated form of income. Figure 4
shows the share of ACT excluding capital gains reported by thetop ACT
recipients. The figure focuses on the period since 1979, and shows that
while the nongain ACI share of this group rose by almostone percent-
age point between 1979 and 1986, it rose by more than three percentage
points between 1986 and 1988. This figure suggests that capital gainsare
not the explanation for the broad trend in the concentration of ACT. Tt
also demonstrates, however, that therewas a rapid increase in reported
noncapital gain income among TARs in the years immediately following
TRA86. This is consistent with the view that these taxpayers reported
more of their income in taxable form when marginal tax rates declined.
Although most of our analysis focuseson the top one-half of 1 percent
of tax returns, we also examined reported ACT for several othersubsets
of the high-income population. The first two columns of Table 4report
the ACT share for the top one-tenth and one-quarter of 1percent of tax
returns. The middle column reports data for the top one-half of 1percent
of taxpayers, the TAR group that we focuson elsewhere. The two right-
most columns show the share of ACT reported by the top 1 and 2percent
11We have not made the various adjustments to AGI that the Congressional BudgetOffice
uses in computing "economic income" of households. For households in our AGI class, the
most important CBO modifications are exclusion of some losses on real property, arguably
the result of tax shelter investments, and the inclusion ofsome corporate tax payments as a
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TABLE 4.
The Share of Income Accruing to Very High-Income Taxpayers,
1979-1989.
Fraction of the income distribution (%)
Year Top 0.001%Top 0.0025%TopO.005%Top 0.01%Top 0.02%
Panel A: Adjusted Gross Income
Source: Authors' tabulations using U.S Treasury Individual Tax Models for years 1979-1989.
of taxpayers for the years 1979-1989. These estimatesare based on the
Treasury Tax Model data bases.
Table 4 shows that even within the top 2 percent of the taxpayer
distribution, the gains in reported AGI during the 1980swere highly
concentrated. The share of AGI reported on the top 2 percent of tax
returns rose by 6.04 percent between 1979 and 1989, but more than half
of this increase, 3.35 percent, was reported on the topone tenth of 1
percent of tax returns (roughly 100,000 tax returns). More than two-
thirds of the increase in AGI for the top 2 percentwas reported by the
top one-quarter of 1 percent of taxpayers. These findings are consistent
with Krugman's (1992) "fractal" hypothesis about the shape of the in-
come distribution.
Figure 5 makes the same point with a slightly different approach.It
1979 2.61 4.18 6.05 8.81 12.90
1980 2.63 4.24 6.12 8.91 13.05
1981 2.63 4.19 6.03 8.76 12.85
1982 3.14 4.81 6.73 9.51 13.66
1983 3.38 5.10 7.04 9.84 13.99
1984 3.66 5.41 7.36 10.14 14.29
1985 3.83 5.66 7.66 10.49 14.64
1986 4.74 6.71 8.84 11.79 16.05
1987 4.90 7.10 9.44 12.64 17.12
1988 6.75 9.38 12.02 15.41 19.93
1989 5.96 8.43 11.00 14.37 18.94
Panel B: Adjusted Gross Income Excluding Capital Gains
1979 2.19 3.66 5.45 8.14 12.15
1980 2.24 3.74 5.54 8.24 12.29
1981 2.20 3.66 5.40 8.04 12.05
1982 2.54 4.08 5.90 8.59 12.64
1983 2.66 4.21 6.02 8.68 12.73
1984 2.87 4.46 6.28 8.94 12.96
1985 2.95 4.58 6.42 9.09 13.10
1986 2.83 4.43 6.26 8.95 13.00
1987 3.65 5.53 7.60 10.52 14.75
1988 5.09 7.37 9.73 12.85 17.18
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FIGURE 5. Distribution of AGI Within Top Percent: 1979-1989.
shows the share of AGI reported by five nonoverlapping groups: the top
0.2 percent, the next 0.2 percent, etc. The top line is the shareof AGI
reported by the top one-fifth of 1 percent of taxpayers. It shows a sharp
increase between 1986 and 1988, and declines slightly in 1989. There has
been a relatively small increase in the AGI shares for all groups below
the top one-fifth of 1 percent of taxpayers.12 This casts doubt on the view
that the factors responsible for the increase in reported incomes among
high-income taxpayers, especially in the 1986-1988 period, are the same
factors that were responsible for the widening of the wage distribution
over a longer time period. Figure 5also underscores the importance of
the post-1986 period in contributing to the changes in reported income
concentration during the 1980s.
The lower panel of Table 4 reports similar calculations for AGI exclud-
ing capital gains. The same pattern emerges, with more thanhalf of the
increase in nongain AGI for the top 2 percent of taxpayers accruing to
the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers. Comparing the upper and lowerpanels
of Table 4 provides interesting evidence, however, on the relative timing
of the concentration of gain and nongain income. While the share of
total AGI, including gains, reported by the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers
12 Our tabulations focus on the distribution of income for taxpayers in each year, not the
distribution of the same taxpayers over time. Thus, the taxpayers in the top AGI category in
one year may be different from those in this category inthe next year. Slemrod (1991)
provides some evidence on the persistence of income for high-income taxpayers.162Feenberg and Poterba
0.005
1979 1980 19811982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
FIGURE 6. Wage Shares Within the Top Percentile: 1979-1 989.
rose from 2.6 percent to 3.8 percent between 1979 and 1985, the share of
nongain income increased less than one percentage point, from 2.2per-
cent to 2.95 percent. In the post-1986 period, however, the nongain
income share for this group grew faster than its share of total AGI.
Capital gain realizations, therefore, were a more important factor in the
concentration of AGI in the early than in the late 1980s.
We can also perform a similar analysis for components of income.
Figure 6 presents data on the share of wages and salaries accruing to
taxpayers in the top 1 percent of the taxpayer distribution.There is
some growth in the share of wages for each of the high-income groups
between 1979 and 1989, but a dramatic increase in the share ofwages for
the top 0.2 percent of taxpayers. Three-quarters of this increaseoccurs
between 1986 and 1988, and the sharp break in the trend growth rate in
1986 is strongly suggestive of a link between TRA86 and this pattern of
reported income.
Figure 7 presents similar data for a longer time period. This data series
is based on aggregate IRS data, and shows the share of wages and
salaries reported by top AGI Recipients. While the rapid increase in
wage concentration after 1986 is unusual by historical standards, the
trend toward rising concentration of wages and salaries began in the
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FIGURE 7. TAR Share of Total Wages: 1951-1990.
early 1970s. The wage share of the TARs rose by nearly 1.5 percentage
points between 1970 and 1980, by another 0.5 percentbetween 1980 and
1985, and then by more than two percentage points inthe two years
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The beginning of thetrend toward
rising wage and salary concentration is roughly coincidentwith the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, which reduced the top tax rate onearned income
from 77 percent to 50 percent. We suspect that the large increasein
reported TAR wages and salaries in the years after 1986reflects, at least
in part, a reporting response to lower marginal tax rates.14
Our findings suggest that whatever forces were behind therising con-
centration of reported income in the high-income ranks duringthe 1980s,
they were strongly concentrated within a small group of taxpayers,and
strongly concentrated in the years after 1986. Withoutmuch more precise
information on the financial and tax-planning activitiesof high-income
taxpayers, it is impossible to determinehow much of the increase in
reported income was due to changes in tax avoidancebehavior; how
4 The difference between Slemrod's (1993) conclusion that there is no evidence for a high-
income "Laffer curve," and our finding supporting a positiveelasticity of reported taxable
income with respect to tax rate reductions, can be traced to thedata we analyze. Slemrod
examines data on relatively few years between 1962 and 1988, and does notfocus on the
short-term changes that take place between tax years 1985 and 1988.His methodology is
therefore designed to detect long-term trends, rather than high-frequencyfluctuations







0.25 r I I I UI II I I I II I I I I II I II II I I III I I
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
FIGURE 8. Wage Share of AGI Among the TAR: 1951-1990.
much was due to changes in real behavior such as labor supply; and how
much was due to changing returns to the factors, labor and capital, that
high-income taxpayers own. This is a central goal for future work.
IV. THE INCOME COMPOSITION OF HIGH-INCOME
TAXPAYERS
The previous section considered the high-income taxpayers' share of
total ACT, AGI excluding capital gains, and wages and salaries. This
section explores the fraction of total income reported by top-income
taxpayers that is from various income sources, and asks how this income
mix has changed over time.
Figure 8 shows wage and salary income as a share of ACT for TARs over
the 1951-1990 period. This share rose during the 1970s, from one-third to
one-half of the ACT for this group. 15 During the 1980s, however, while the
concentration of wage income increased, the wage share of income for
the TARs actually declined. This is not just an artifact of rising capital gain
15The U.S. House Ways and Means Committee (1991) reports data from the Congressional
Budget Office on the top 1 percent of the income distribution for households. The increase
in the share of wage income, from 34.2 percent in 1977 to 38.4 percent in 1988, is less
pronounced in part because of the larger set of households included in the CBO's "top 1
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FIGURE 9. Share of Dividends in TAR Income: 1951-1990.
realizations; if the figure were redrawn with the share of wages in
nongain ACT, it would look almost identical. Figure 8 also shows a very
sharp decline, by over ten percentage points, between 1985 and 1987.
Figure 9 reports an analogous calculation for dividend income. The
stylized view that high-income taxpayers derive most of their income
from dividend payments has become increasingly inappropriate during
the last three decades. TARs drew roughly one-quarter of their taxable
income from dividends in the early 1950s, but only 6 percentof their ACT
from this source in 1989.16 Figure 10 shows that the share of dividends
received by high-income taxpayers has also fallen. In the late 1980s, the
top 0.5 percent of taxpayers reported roughly one-quarterof the divi-
dends on all tax returns, compared with nearly half of all dividends in the
late 1950s. These calculations are based on taxable dividends, and there-
fore exclude dividends received on equity held in TRAs, 401(k)s, and other
tax-sheltered forms. Tt is difficult to argue that the growth of such invest-
ment vehicles is large enough to explain the pattern inFigure 10.
The analogous time series for interest income, shown in Figure 11,
displays a rather different pattern. The share of interest income received
TARs declined between 1951 and the early 1960s, was stable at about 10
percent until 1986, and then rose by almost five percentage pointsbe-
16One factor that may partly explain this trend, especially in the 1980s, is the riseof money
market mutual fund shares, which may generate dividends for lower-income households.166Feenberg and Poterba
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FIGURE 11. TAR Share of Total Interest Income: 1951-1990.
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tween 1986 and 1988. Because clientele models of assetownership sug-
gest that the relative tax rates of different investors play a keyrole in
determining portfolio composition, the post-1986 changes may reflect
the changing relative marginal tax rates of TARs and other investors.
TRA86 reduced the tax penalty associated with holding interest-bearing
securities at top-income brackets. This legislated tax reduction was re-
inforced by declining inflation rates in the late 1980s, which further
reduced the effective tax burden on interest income received by high-
income households.
The next source of income we consider is capital gains. Figure 12
shows that the share of all capital gains reported by top-income taxpay-
ers was stable at approximately 45 percentthroughout the 1950s and
1960s, but fell to only 20 percent in the late 1970s. This was a period
when, as we noted previously, the marginal tax rate on capital gains
received by high-income taxpayers could exceed 40 percent. The share of
capital gains reported by these taxpayers rose during the 1980s, to just
over 50 percent in the second half of thedecade.
The sharp decline in the top AGI recipients' share of capital gains in
1978 reflects behavioral response to the preannounced reduction in capi-
tal gains tax rates that was enacted in TRA78. Because the minimum tax
provisions that affected realizations in calendar year 1978, but not 1979,
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FIGURE 12. TAR Share of Net Capital Gains: 1 951-1 990.168Feenberg and Poterba
an incentive to delay gain realizations from 1978 to 1979. Consequently,
their share of reported gains fell sharply in 1978 and rebounded in 1979.
This example highlights a more general point about the interpretation
of our data on TAR shares of various income sources. These sharesare
sensitive to relative tax incentives, and the relative opportunities to re-
spond to these incentives, that face taxpayers at different places in the
income distribution. In 1978, when only top-income households hadan
incentive to delay gains, their share of total gains changed dramatically.
This should be contrasted with the relatively stable TAR share of gain
realizations around the enactment of TRA86. In 1986, taxpayers through-
out the income distribution had an incentive to realize gains to avoid
prospective marginal rate increases. The total volume of realized gains
rose sharply, but the share of these gains realized by high-income house-
holds was not very different from the share in other years.
We consider one further income category, income from Subchapter S
corporations. Figure 13 shows that the share of profits from these compa-
nies reported by TARs rose during the 1980s, but the most rapid increase
occurred between 1981 and 1984. Subchapter S profits are now highly
concentrated at top income levels: taxpayers in the top 0.1 percent of the
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1987-1989 period. The increase in the share of Subchapter S income was
also very concentrated, with relatively little increase in theshare of this
income reported by taxpayers just below the top 0.1 percent.
Although the share of Subchapter S income reported by TARsdid not
rise appreciably in the years after TRA86, the total amountof such in-
come did increase sharply (seeGordon and Mackie-Mason (1990)). Our
tabulations of Subchapter S income reported in the TreasuryTax Model
data files suggest this income category doubled between 1985and 1988,
and accounted for more than $40 billion in 1988. BecauseTARs (the top
0.5 percent of taxpayers) receive approximately 70 percentof Subchapter
S income, the 1985-1988 increase explains approximately$14 billion of
the reported income growth for this group.
V. THE CHANGING MIX OF FACTORINCOMES AND
INCOME INEQUALITY
Some types of income are distributed less equallythan others. The distri-
bution of reported AGI may become moreunequal if the inequality of
some AGI components increases, orthe relative importance of some
particularly unequally distributed components increases.17 Inthis sec-
tion we investigate whether the changing mix ofincome components
during the 1980s can explain much of the increasingconcentration of
AGI that we observed in previous sections.
We investigate this question by constructing acounterfactual income
distribution for each year of the 1980s. We maintained the 1979distribu-
tion of each type of income across tax returnsbut allowed the level of
each income type to vary from year to year as the aggregateStatistics of
Income data suggest. 18
Table 5 presents the results of our calculations, which suggestthat the
shifting mix of factor incomes did contribute to an increase inthe concen-
tration of ACT during the 1980s. If the distribution of eachincome type
had remained at its 1979 level, but the mix of income typeshad changed
as it did, the share of ACT accruing toTARs would have increased from
6.05 percent in 1979 to 7.69 percent by 1988.This is substantially less
than the actual increase, to 12.02 percent. Our predicted incomeshare
tracks the actual income share much better for the years before1986 than
17 Karoly (1993) shows how to formally decompose one measure of aggregate income
inequality, the Gini coefficient, into a weighted sum of Gini coefficientsfor the various
income components.
In cases where an income source can be negative, forexample with Schedule C or E
income, we varied and distributed positive and negative incomeseparately.170Feenberg and Poterba
TABLE 5.
Actual Income Shares versus Forecast Shares Using 1979 Factor
Distributions.
Adjusted AGI excluding
gross income (%) capital gains (%)
Year Actual Forecast Actual Forecast
Source: Authors' calculations using annual data from U.S. Treasury Statistics of Income: Individual Tax
Returns publications, as well as the U.S. Treasury Individual Tax Model for years 1979-1988. Cell
contents indicate the share of aggregate income on tax returns going to top AG! recipients.
in the 1987-1988 period. We also present results for a similar exercise
with AGI excluding capital gains, which yields similar results. These
estimates suggest that the rising share of income reported by TARs
during the last decade cannot simply be attributed to a shifting mix of
income components, but rather reflects some shift in the underlying
distribution of these components as well.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Our analysis of tax return data suggests that the rising share of AGI
reported on high-income tax returns in the last decade is largely due to
an increase in the share of AGI reported by only a few tenths of 1 percent
of the taxpaying population. The changes through time in the reported
incomes of taxpayers near the top of the income distribution, even those
in the "lower half" of the top 1 percent of all taxpayers, are substantially
different than the changes for the highest income taxpayers, especially
in the years following the 1986 Tax Reform Act. This suggests that the
rapid growth in reported incomes at very high-income levelsmay not be
part of a general trend toward a widening income distribution, but
rather may reflect other factors including a tax-induced change in the
incentives that high-income households face for reporting taxable in-
1979 6.05 6.05 5.45 5.45
1980 6.12 5.84 5.54 5.35
1981 6.03 5.73 5.40 5.26
1982 6.73 5.72 5.90 5.22
1983 7.04 5.88 6.02 5.23
1984 7.36 5.95 6.28 5.27
1985 7.66 6.15 6.42 5.41
1986 8.84 6.97 6.26 5.34
1987 9.44 7.15 7.60 5.57
1988 12.02 7.69 9.73 6.11
1989 11.00 7.52 9.12 6.00Income Inequality/Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers171
come. Our evidence casts doubt onthe view, presented forcefully in
Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan's (1966) study, that tax incentives havelittle
effect on the decisions of high-income households.
Our results are not inconsistent with the widely documented pattern
of growing wage inequality in recent years. Many of the studiesthat find
widening wage disparities are based on the Current PopulationSurvey
(CPS), however, so they have little or no information on the incomesof
top-income households. Income items are "top-coded" at $100,000 in the
CPS. The widening inequality observed throughout the wagedistribu-
tion creates a strong presumption that wages and salaries atthe very top
of the income distribution have increased relative to those elsewhere.
Yet those studies do not suggest that the period after 1986 wasmarked
by sharp acceleration in the dispersion of earning power. Thefinding
that the growth in AGI for very high-income taxpayers was most rapid in
the post-1986 years suggests that the underlying determinantsof re-
ported AGI for this group may be significantly different from the deter-
minants of relative incomes at lower incomes.
There are many directions in which our work can be extended. Our
analysis focuses on pretax incomes, rather than the after-tax incomesthat
provide individuals with command over resources. Computingeffective
tax rates on different taxpayers requires various imputationsof taxes on
firms and workers, as in Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder (1993) orCBO
(1992b), and we have not attempted this complex task.
The most pressing research priority involves searching for sourcesof
data other than tax returns that provide information on the accruing
incomes of high-income individuals. There are some sourcesof informa-
tion on compensation for highly paid individuals. These includethe data
set on chief executive officer pay compiled byJoskow, Rose, and Shep-
ard (1993), as well as surveys of earnings by lawyers and doctors that are
carried out by professional organizations. These data sets may permit
some analysis of how tax reformshave affected the mix of compensa-
tion, while also providing further evidence on the trends in earnings,if
not total income, for high-income taxpayers.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX: INTERPOLATION USING
THE PARETO DISTRIBUTION
The Pareto distribution specifies that the probability that arandomly
chosen taxpayer's income, y, is greater than x is:
Pr(y> x) = (kIx'. (1)172Feenberg and Poterba
The two parameters are k, the minimum income that the Pareto distribu-
tion applies to (k> 0), and a, the exponent that determines the shape of
the distribution.
Our objective is to estimate the total income of roughly the top 0.5
percent of taxpayers. Reported data on the number of tax returns and
total AGI for taxpayers in different AGI categories provideus with exact
income totals for several groups of high-income taxpayers. We can there-
fore identify the income range where the threshold for the top 0.5per-
cent of taxpayers will fall. To estimate the precise threshold, we estimate
the parameters of the Pareto distribution using informationon the re-
ported income cutoffs that bracket the actual threshold in each year.19
Denote these cutoff incomes asYi and Y2' and the associated probabilities
that a taxpayer's income will fall below these cutoffs as F1 and F2,respec-




1 - F2 = (k/y2)''
Solving these two equations yields an estimate of a:
â= log [(1 - F1)/(1 - F2)]flog [Y2/Y1}.
Given this value for a, our estimate of k is
k = Yi(l - F1)11°.
A discussion of some of the issues involved in estimating parameters of
the Pareto distribution can be found in Johnson and Kotz (1970) and
Quandt (1966). Ryoo and Rosen (1992) present a recent application of the
Pareto distribution to relatively high incomes.
Table A-i shows our parameter estimates for each year between 1951
and 1990. The parameter k is measured in current dollars andcorre-
sponds to the income level below which the Pareto distribution would
not apply. The estimates of k are surprisingly small. We found that the
Pareto distribution fit the actual distribution very poorly in therange of
McCubbin and Scheuren (1988) discuss an alternative approach to interpolation from the
published SOl data.Income Inequality/Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers173
TABLE A-i.
Estimated Pareto Distribution Parameters,











































1990 1.59 6698174Feenberg and Poterba
Ic, but fit well at high incomes. The a parameter, which determines the
rate at which the density of households declines as one moves to higher
incomes, rises between the early 1950s and 1970, and then declines for
the following two decades.
The income threshold y* that oniy 100s% of all taxpayers have incomes
above satisfies the equation s = (kIy')so y* = ks1. Our estimate of the
total income accruing to taxpayers with incomes above y* is therefore
= Nfxf(x) dx = Nfâkxdx, (5)
where N denotes the total number of tax returns. When we need to
interpolate particular types of income rather than AGI, we assume that
the amount of income in each category (w1) is related to AGI (y) according
to a power function, w = cy. For example, total wages and salaries
received by taxpayers with incomes above y1, which we shall denote w1,
is given by:
w1 = N f° cxakax dx. (6)
Evaluating this expression and a similar equation for w2 using our esti-
mates of k and a yields two equations in two unknowns, 6 and c. Solving
yields:
6 = log[w1/w2]Ilog[y1/y2] + a (7)
and
c = w1(a - 6)INakx. (8)
Because the actual amount of wage income aboveY2 is a published
aggregate, only the amount of wages between y andY2 needs to be
approximated.
We performed several validation exercises on our estimated Pareto
distributions and found that they fit the actual income data reasonably
well in the neighborhood of y. For years since 1979, we can compareour
estimate of the share of income accruing to top-income taxpayers with
the more accurate estimates from the public use version of the Treasury
Individual Tax Model. Table A-2 presents the results of this validation
exercise. The largest error in our estimate of the share of total income
accruing to high-income taxpayers is 0.44 percent, in 1982, and the next
largest error is 0.36 percent in 1986. That year's exceptional level ofTABLE A-2.
Actual and Estimated Income Share of Top AGI Recipients,1979-1989.
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Source: Authors' calculations using annual data from U.S. TreasuryStatistics of Income: Individual Tax
Returns publications, as described in the text, as well as the U.S.Treasury Individual Tax Model for
years 1979-1988.
capital gain realizations may contribute to our error,particularly if real-
ized capital gains are not distributed according to aPareto distribution.
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